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Diego Gragnaniello, Francesco Marra, Giovanni Poggi and Luisa Verdoliva
Abstract—Deep neural networks provide unprecedented per-
formance in all image classification problems, taking advantage
of huge amounts of data available for training. Recent studies,
however, have shown their vulnerability to adversarial attacks,
spawning an intense research effort in this field. With the aim
of building better systems, new countermeasures and stronger
attacks are proposed by the day. On the attacker’s side, there is
growing interest for the realistic black-box scenario, in which
the user has no access to the neural network parameters.
The problem is to design efficient attacks which mislead the
neural network without compromising image quality. In this
work, we propose to perform the black-box attack along a
low-distortion path, so as to improve both the attack efficiency
and the perceptual quality of the adversarial image. Numerical
experiments on real-world systems prove the effectiveness of the
proposed approach, both in benchmark classification tasks and
in key applications in biometrics and forensics.
Index Terms—Image classification, deep learning, adversarial
attacks, black-box.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are by now widespread
in industry and society as a whole, finding application in
uncountable fields, from the movie industry, to autonomous
driving, humanoid robots, computer-assisted diagnosis, and
so on. Well trained DNNs largely outperform conventional
systems, and can compete with human experts on a large
variety of tasks. In particular, there has been a revolution in
all vision-related tasks, which now rely almost exclusively
on deep-learning solutions, starting from the 2012 seminal
work of Krizhevsky et al. [1] where state-of-the-art image
classification performance was achieved with a convolutional
neural network (CNN).
Recent studies [2], however, have exposed some alarming
weaknesses of DNNs. By injecting suitable adversarial noise
on a given image, a malicious attacker can mislead a DNN
into deciding for a wrong class, and even force it to output
a desired wrong class, selected in advance by the attacker, a
scenario described in Fig.1. What is worse, such attacks are
extremely simple to perform. By exploiting backpropagation,
one can compute the gradient of the loss with respect to
the input image, and build effective adversarial samples by
gradient ascent/descent methods. Large loss variations can
be induced by small changes in the image, ensuring that
adversarial samples keep a good perceptual quality.
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Fig. 1. Attack scenario. The attacker adds adversarial noise W to the original
image x0 to generate xa = x + W . This attacked image should be similar
to x0 but such that the associated CNN output ya is close to the target yt.
Obviously, such findings spawned intense investigation on
this topic. A first line of research was to find countermeasures
to render classifiers more resilient to adversarial attacks. One
natural solution is adversarial training, that is, augmenting
the training set with challenging adversarial samples [3],
[4], thereby hardening the classifier. With Distillation [5],
[6], instead, the classifier is trained using soft labels (class
probabilities from another net) rather than hard labels, so as
to reduce the likelihood of leaving blind spots in the decision
space. Another approach is to use ad hoc external detectors
[7], [8], [9] to reveal the presence of adversarial noise, thus
telling apart original from manipulated images. We refer to
the recent survey from Akhtar et al. [10] for a more thorough
review of these methods.
On the attacker’s side, following [2] several improvements
have been proposed [11], [12], [4], [13], mostly gradient-
descent methods with the gradient estimated through back-
propagation. The first and most widespread approach of this
category is the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [11]
together with its iterative version (I-FGSM) [3]. Such methods,
however, require perfect knowledge of the network archi-
tecture and weights, a white box scenario which is hardly
encountered in real-world applications. The focus is therefore
shifting towards black-box attacks, where nothing is known in
advance about the network structure, its weights, or the dataset
used for training.
In this scenario, the attacker can query the network at will
and observe the outcome. This latter can be just a hard label,
the distribution of probabilities across the classes (confidence
levels), or even a feature vector. Various approaches have been
proposed to attack the classifier. The most promising ones rely
on the use of surrogate networks [14], [15], [16] or, again, on
gradient-descent [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], with the gradient
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now estimated by means of suitable queries to the network.
Here, we propose a new query-based black-box attack,
focusing especially on preserving the perceptual quality of
the attacked images. Indeed, adversarial attacks should satisfy
three main requirements at the same time: being i) effective,
ii) fast, and iii) inconspicuous. The first requirement needs
no comment, as it is the primary goal of the attack. Efficiency
(low number of queries) is also necessary to prevent the attack
from becoming exceedingly slow. As for the third requirement,
images with large distortion can be easily identified by dedi-
cated statistical tests [7], [8], [9], and sent to visual inspection.
At this point, unnatural images, characterized for example by
weird colored patches over a smooth background or by other
perceptual quality impairments, will be readily detected.
To address this problem, we propose a novel perceptual
quality-preserving (PQP) black-box attack, where quality is
ensured in advance by a judicious choice of the perturbation
path. Although its detailed description is deferred to Section
III, we highlight here its major features and innovative contri-
butions.
1) In the current literature, image quality is taken into
account only a posteriori, to reject or clip perturbations
when the distortion exceeds a given threshold or to stop
the attack. Instead, PQP analyzes the image beforehand
to identify dynamically a “safe” image region, corre-
sponding to low distortion gradient, where adversarial
noise produces the least effects on image quality, while
significantly impacting classification. Therefore, the at-
tack follows a low-distortion path, avoiding ineffective
perturbations, and ensuring good quality at completion.
2) To reduce the visibility of the attack, we realy on a
perceptual measure of image quality rather than some
Lp norm. In particular, we use the structural similarity
(SSIM) index [22], because of its wide acceptance in the
community and simple formulation. The SSIM gradient
image is computed with negligible computational effort
by means of a simple dedicated CNN.
3) PQP enforces from the beginning the constraint of 8-
bit integer images and perturbations. This is absolutely
reasonable, since real-world classifiers accept queries
only in integer-valued formats, such as PNG or JPG.
In fact, most methods working on floating-point data
exhibit a catastrophic performance impairment when the
integer constraint is enforced.
4) We assess performance not only for classification on a
widespread benchmark dataset, but also for realistic bio-
metric and forensic applications. Moreover, we include
and analyze several defensive strategies. In all cases,
the proposed method outperforms reference techniques.
A preliminary version of PQP scored best in the recent
“Adversarial Attacks on Black Box Face Recognition”
competition.
In the rest of the paper, we analyze related work (Section II)
provide the necessary background (Section III), describe the
proposed method (Section IV), present experimental results
in various scenarios of interest (Section V), and eventually
(Section VI) draw conclusions.
II. RELATED WORK
Here, we revise briefly query-based methods for black-
box attack to deep neural networks. The first such methods
have been proposed almost simultaneously in 2017. In [17] a
zeroth order stochastic (ZOO) coordinate descent algorithm is
proposed, based on the coordinate-wise ADAM optimizer or
on coordinate-wise Newtons method. Both solutions modify
dynamically the intensity of the attack, the former proving
eventually more effective. Since the basic method is extremely
slow, several strategies are proposed to reduce the number
of queries: dimension reduction via bilinear interpolation,
hierarchical attack and importance sampling.
In [18] a greedy local search is carried out with the aim of
perturbing only a few patches, those which impact most on the
output probabilities. To be effective, however, the attack itself
is rather strong, and the final images exhibit odd patches with
brightly colored pixels, which are easily spotted and are sort
of a trademark of the attack. Moreover, a very large number of
queries is necessary to complete the attack, as observed also in
[19]. Along the same line, [23] proposes to apply single-pixel
adversarial perturbations, extended to groups of five pixels in
[24]. The most suitable pixels to attack are selected using
differential evolution, a simple genetic algorithm. Again, such
attacks are easily spotted and are also extremely fragile to
any form of image processing. In addition, the success rate
remains rather limited, below 80%, even in the most favourable
conditions.
In [19] a gradient estimation strategy is used, followed by
the classical FGSM attack. The main focus is on limiting
the number of queries with respect to the baseline pixel-wise
method. Good results are obtained with PCA-based prioritiza-
tion, but off-line estimation of the principal components is
not always possible. A more practical approach is random
grouping, which compares favourably with ZOO [17], and
proves effective also with real-world systems and state-of-the-
art defenses. A further variation of ZOO, called AutoZOOM
(autoencoder-based zeroth order optimization method), is pro-
posed in [20]. It uses an adaptive random gradient estimation
strategy to balance query counts and distortion, and gains
efficiency with respect to ZOO by reducing the resolution of
the original image, thus limiting the attack space. Subsampling
is obtained by using an autoencoder trained off-line with
unlabeled data or through bilinear interpolation. Again, the
first solution, though more effective, requires significant prior
information.
Also [21] pursues the main goal of limiting the number
of queries. To this end, it makes use of natural evolution
strategies (NES) to estimate the black-box output gradient
with respect to the attacked input image, and generate suitable
adversarial samples. It does not compare with ZOO because
of the different experimental setting, with a constraint in
L∞ rather than L2, but claims to need far less queries to
generate imperceptible adversarial examples. In the very same
work [21] other variants of the same method are presented
to address more challenging scenarios, including the case in
which only the predicted class is returned by the black-box.
This latter problem is considered also in [25], where a random
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walk on the decision boundary of the black-box is performed
to minimize image distortion while changing the predicted
class, and in [26], which relies on a randomized gradient-free
method.
To conclude this analysis, we observe that several elegant
solutions, e.g., [17], [20], [21], rely on real-valued (that is, non-
integer) perturbations. The attack is iteratively refined based
on closed-form optimization and estimation methods, and the
changes are often quite subtle. These small changes, however,
are readily washed out by any form of image compression or
even just rounding, with a catastrophic performance impair-
ment. Unfortunately, this is exactly what happens in real-world
popular systems, such as IBM Watson Visual Recognition
[27], Clarifai [28], and Google Cloud Vision AI [29], which
accept images only in standard integer formats, like PNG or
JPG. Therefore, we believe that practical attacks should be
designed and tested to prove robust to such common data-
format scenarios.
III. BACKGROUND
A CNN used for image classification computes a function
y = f(x; θ) (1)
which maps an input image, x ∈ Rn1×n2×n3 , into an output
vector, y ∈ RL. In the following, with no loss of generality,
we will consider color images, hence n3 = 3. The specific
function implemented by the CNN depends on the model
parameters, θ, namely, the CNN weights which are learned
during the training phase to optimize a suitable loss function.
Here, we consider two scenarios of practical interest. In the
first one, the classes are known in advance, and the system
is asked to decide which class the query belongs to, and how
reliable the decision is. Accordingly, it provides in output a
vector of probabilities
y(i) = Pr(x ∈ Ci), i = 1, . . . , L (2)
also called confidence levels, with Ci the i-th class, and L
equal to the number of classes. The decision is made in favor
of the maximum-probability class. In the second scenario, a
scalable system is considered, where the classes are not known
in advance, and their number grows with time. This applies,
for example, to biometric identification systems, where new
users keep being enrolled all the time. In this case the CNN is
used as a feature extractor. For each input image, x, the CNN
generates a discriminative vector of features, y, with length L
unrelated with the number of classes, which is then used to
perform the actual classification, for example, with a minimum
distance rule. In both cases, we assume the CNN to be already
trained, with parameters θ defined once and for all. Therefore,
in the following we will neglect dependencies on θ.
As recalled in the Introduction, CNN-based systems are
vulnerable to adversarial attacks. The attacker’s goal is to
modify the input image in an imperceptible way, so as
to induce the system into generating a desired output. To
formalize the problem, we define: x0, the original image,
y0 = f(x0), the output vector associated with it, xa = x0+W ,
the modified image, with W the additive adversarial noise,
ya = f(xa), the output vector associated with it, and yt,
the target output vector. Moreover, we introduce L(y1, y2), a
suitable loss function measuring vector mismatch in the output
domain, and D(x1, x2), a suitable measure of the image-
domain distortion. The attacker’s aim is to generate a new
image, xa, that is close to the original in the source domain,
hence small D(xa, x0), but whose associated vector is close
to the target vector in the output domain, small L(ya, yt), as
described pictorially in Fig.1.
We cast the problem as a constrained optimization, setting a
limit on the acceptable image distortion, Dmax. Accordingly,
the attacker looks for the image xa defined by
xa = arg min
x
L(f(x), yt), s.t. D(x, x0) ≤ Dmax (3)
For typical classification problems, the loss of choice is
the cross-entropy. Instead, when the CNN is used for feature
extraction, we will consider the Euclidean distance between
the extracted feature vectors. As for image distortion, most
algorithms proposed thus far use the L1 or L2 norms. Instead,
we will consider the SSIM [22] (a measure of similarity,
strictly speaking), in order to better take into account the
perceptual distortion between original and attacked image. The
structural similarity of two image patches p and q is defined
as
SSIM(p, q) =
(2µpµq + 1)(2σpq + 2)
(µ2p + µ
2
q + 1)(σ
2
p + σ
2
q + 2)
(4)
where µp, µq, σp, σq are mean and standard deviation of the
two patches, σpq their covariance, and the small constants 1
and 2 are used to avoid division by zero. The SSIM is unitary
for identical patches, and virtually zero for orthogonal patches.
By averaging over all homologous patches, one obtains the
image-level SSIM. The SSIM, taking into account the effect
of perturbations on image structures, correlates better than Lp
norms with the visual perception of quality. Moreover, it is
a differentiable measure, allowing one to implement simple
SSIM-based attacks.
As for the attack strategies, starting from a given image, x,
the small perturbation ∆W that maximizes the loss decrease
is, by definition, proportional to the gradient of the loss itself
with respect to x
∆W ∼ ∇xL(f(x), yt) (5)
If the loss is differentiable and the CNN is perfectly known
with its parameters, namely, in the white box scenario, the
gradient can be computed through backpropagation, allowing
very effective attack strategies. In this paper, however, we
consider a black-box (BB) scenario, in which the attacker has
no information about the model architecture, its parameters, θ,
or the training set used to learn them. However, the attacker
can query the system at will, and observe the corresponding
outputs. Therefore, even if the gradient cannot be directly
computed, it can be estimated by means of suitable queries.
For any unit-norm direction of interest, φ, the attacker collects
the outputs, y+ and y−, corresponding to the opposite queries
x+ = x + φ and x− = x − φ, with  suitably small, and
estimates the derivative of L along φ as,
∂L
∂φ
' L(y
+, yt)− L(y−, yt)
2
(6)
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If the selected directions are the image components (pixel
color components) the whole gradient can be computed, even
though at the cost of a large number of queries.
Actually, since querying the system has a non-negligible
cost, computing the whole gradient is not a viable approach,
and practical algorithms approximate gradient-based BB at-
tacks through more efficient strategies. In addition, if images
are quantized, for example to 256 levels, effective perturba-
tions cannot be arbitrarily small, but must involve an integer
number of levels per each pixel.
IV. PROPOSED METHOD
A major peculiarity of the proposed method is its focus on
actively preserving the perceptual quality of attacked images.
We measure quality by the image SSIM, averaging patch-
wise SSIM values computed over homologous patches of
original and attacked image. Since SSIM measures similarity,
we reformulate the attack goal as
xa = arg min
x
Lt(x) s.t. SSIM0(xa) ≥ SSIMmin (7)
where we have simplified notation introducing Lt(x) =
L(f(x), yt) and SSIM0(x) = SSIM(x, x0), considering that
yt and x0 are given once and for all.
Procedure 1 A naive SSIM-guided attack
Input: x0, yt,SSIMmin
Output: xa
1: x = x0
2: while SSIM0(x) > SSIMmin do
3: G = ∇xSSIM0(x)
4: s1 = arg mins maxc |G(s, c)|
5: L+ = Lt(x+ 1s1 ) . BB query
6: L− = Lt(x− 1s1 ) . BB query
7: if L+ < L− then
8: x = x+ 1s1
9: else
10: x = x− 1s1
11: end if
12: end while
13: xa = x
A. Basic version of the proposed algorithm
A naive algorithm pursuing this goal is described in Proce-
dure 1. The algorithm modifies iteratively the original image,
x0 = x0(s, c), with s the spatial coordinates and c the color
band, until the stopping condition on the SSIM is reached. At
each step, the gradient of the SSIM with respect to the current
attack, x, is computed, G = ∇xSSIM0(x), which allows to
identify the spatial site, s1, where a perturbation causes the
least increase of the SSIM. In more detail, we select
s1 = arg min
s
max
c
|G(s, c)| (8)
and generate two new images x+ = x+1s1 and x
− = x−1s1
which differ from x only on site s1 where all color components
are increased or decreased coherently by 1 level. The system
is probed with these queries, and the one that most reduces
the loss becomes the new attacked image. These steps are then
repeated until convergence.
Procedure 2 PQP: efficient SSIM-guided attack
Input: x0, yt, SSIMmin,Lmin, Q,N, δ, kmax
Output: xa
1: x = x0
2: while SSIM0(x) > SSIMmin and Lt(y) > Lmin do
3: G = ∇xSSIM0(x)
4: Mlow = Segment(G, Q) . select low-gradient pixels
5: k = 0
6: ∆L = 0
7: while k < kmax and ∆L ≥ 0 do
8: ∆W = Perturbation(Mlow, N, δ) . generate ∆W
9: L+ = Lt(x+ ∆W ) . BB query
10: L− = Lt(x−∆W ) . BB query
11: ∆L = min(L+,L−)− Lt(x)
12: k = k + 1 . if k=kmax accept anyway
13: end while
14: if L+ < L− then
15: x = x+ ∆W
16: else
17: x = x−∆W
18: end if
19: end while
20: xa = x;
This naive algorithm captures faithfully the spirit of our
approach and display already its major innovations, which
we discuss in subsection C. However it is not acceptable
for practical use. In fact, by modifying only one pixel at a
time, and by the minimum amount possible, it follows quite
a conservative schedule, with very slow convergence to the
solution. Moreover, the deterministic choice of the pixel to
modify leads with high probability to local minima. So, we
now describe a new version of the algorithm which overcomes
these problems and includes some further constraints. This will
be the actual PQP algorithm used in the final experiments.
B. Full-fledged PQP algorithm
First of all, to speed up the attack, PQP uses larger per-
turbations, as is common practice in the literature, modifying
N ≥ 1 pixels at once, by δ ≥ 1 levels each. So, we pick
the N spatial sites characterized by the lowest SSIM gradient,
S = {s1, . . . , sN} and define a perturbation ∆W which is
zero for s /∈ S and equal to +δ or −δ over S. In formulas,
∆W (si, c) = Ziδ, i = 1, ..., N, c = 1, ..., 3 (9)
where the Zi’s are independent random variables with Pr(Zi=
+1) = Pr(Zi=−1)=1/2. As in the naive algorithm, the net
is queried twice, with x+ ∆W and x−∆W , and the query
which most reduces the loss is accepted. If neither reduces the
loss, a new random perturbation is generated, with the same
rules. After kmax unsuccessful attempts, the image is modified
anyway to escape local minima.
A second improvement consists in choosing the set of mod-
ified pixel randomly rather then deterministically, to reduce
the risk of being trapped in local minima. Accordingly, after
computing the gradient of the SSIM with respect to the current
attack, we segment the image in two regions, corresponding
to low-gradient and high-gradient areas and choose the set S
randomly, with the only constraint that all sites belong to the
low-gradient area. Then, the perturbation ∆W is generated as
described before. Experiments discussed in Section V suggest
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Fig. 2. Proposed PQP attack strategy. The original image is iteratively updated by modifying only low-SSIM-gradient pixels. The procedure terminates when
Lt(y) < Lmin (success) or when SSIM0(x) < SSIMmin (failure). The inner cycle allows for the selection of effective perturbations.
to draw attacked pixels from a large part of the image,
excluding only pixels that cause a sharp increase of the SSIM.
Procedure 2 provides a more formal description of the
algorithm, depicted also graphically in Fig.2. The function
“Segment” generates the map Mlow with the smallest SSIM-
gradient pixels, where the parameter Q ∈ [0, 1] defines which
fraction of the n1×n2 image pixels, e.g. 50%, to keep in the
map. The function “Perturbation”, instead, selects N pixels
from Mlow and generates a perturbation matrix, ∆W , which
is non-zero only in the selected pixels, where a value of ±δ
is assigned, keeping the same sign for all color components
of the same pixel.
Notice that, partially deviating from the formalization of
Eq.(7), the attack stops not only when the minimum allowed
SSIM is reached, but also if the loss goes below a given
level, Lmin. This is convenient when the attack is very easy
and a very small loss is obtained quickly, in which case
proceeding with the attack would be a waste of resources.
On the contrary, when the attack is very difficult, it may go
on for an exceedingly long time. Therefore, a further stopping
condition on the maximum number of iterations is included,
not shown in the pseudocode for the sake of clarity.
C. Discussion of innovative contributions
PQP proposes a change of perspective with respect to the
current literature. Conventional methods aim at minimizing
the loss by descending its gradient with respect to the current
image. Controls on image quality come only a posteriori, to
verify the quality constraint and reject unsuitable perturba-
tions. Therefore, the image quality may impair very quickly as
the attack proceeds, approaching soon the distortion limit. This
impacts also on efficiency. In fact, when the current attack is
just below the distortion threshold, most random perturbations
must be rejected for violating the quality constraint. Hence,
the space of admissible perturbations is much reduced, which
impacts on their effectiveness.
In PQP, the approach is reversed. The gradient of distortion
with respect to the current image is computed first, so as to find
a “safe” low-gradient region where perturbations can be made
without increasing distortion too much. This area is selected a
priori and changes dynamically as the attack proceeds. As
Fig. 3. From top to bottom: original image from the CIFAR10 test set,
the initial SSIM gradient used by PQP, the saliency map computed for the
VGG16 net, and the result of the PQP attack. The SSIM gradient is rather
low in active areas of the image (e.g., edges), which tend to include also high
saliency points. The final attack shows only minor differences with respect to
the original, and does not show unnatural artifacts.
a consequence, image quality remains high throughout the
attack, with no serious constraint on perturbations.
A further key ingredient of our proposal is the use of a
perceptual measure of quality, the SSIM. With this choice, we
require errors to be not just small but inconspicuous. It is well
known from the psychophysics of vision that error visibility
depends strongly on the context. For example, the same δ-
level error will stand out in a homogeneous regions, and be
easily overlooked in a active regions. Context is taken into
account by the SSIM, while it is immaterial for Lp distortion
laws. Fig.3 provides some examples. On the first row we
show some 32×32-pixel images of the CIFAR10 dataset and,
on the next row, the corresponding SSIM gradient images.
Low-gradient regions (dark) follow pretty closely the active
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Fig. 4. Correlation index of the loss gradient between adjacent pixels (blue)
and adjacent color channels (red). Histograms are computed on the CIFAR10
dataset for ResNet32, ResNet56, MobileNet and VGG16.
regions of the image, rich of keypoints, edges and textures,
where perturbations will be less visible. Even more interesting,
these very same regions are also among the most important
for image classification. This appears clearly from the third
row of the figure, which shows the saliency maps for the
VGG16 net, highlighting pixels that contribute most to the
final decision. The strong correlation between gradient images
and saliency maps suggests that perturbations made in the low
SSIM-gradient regions will (on the average) have also a strong
impact on classification, with good chances to complete the
attack with a small number of queries. On the last row of Fig.3
we show the final (successful) adversarial samples produced by
PQP, barely distinguishable from the originals and free from
unnatural artifacts.
We note, in passing, that the SSIM gradient can be com-
puted both in closed form, as shown in [30], and by means of
a simple convolutional network, as we do here. Appendix A
provides details on both solutions. In both cases, the compu-
tation time is negligible with respect to the time necessary to
query the system.
Another peculiar design choice of PQP is to attack co-
herently all color components of a pixel. We arrived at this
solution by trials and errors, while developing a preliminary
version of PQP: color-coherent attacks ensured faster con-
vergence and higher SSIM. Our interpretation was that hue-
preserving perturbations are less disturbing for humans and
SSIM alike. However, we provide here a solid experimental
support to this choice, and show that color-coherency is a
feature already present in the white-box attacks that black-box
attacks try to mimic.
For several CNNs, we used backpropagation to extract the
gradient of the loss with respect to images of the CIFAR10
dataset. Then, we computed the correlation index between
the gradients of same-pixel color components. Finally, we
collected the indexes obtained for all images of the dataset
in the histograms shown in Fig.4. It clearly appears that,
for all tested nets, gradients are strongly correlated across
color components. Namely, the optimal white-box attack,
which we try to approximate by means of black-box queries,
tends to modify all color components in a coherent way. For
comparison, we also report the histograms of the correlation
index between same-color component adjacent pixels. In this
case, little or no correlation appears, which cast some shadows
on query reduction strategies based on image downsampling.
Based on this evidence, a good attack should modify only
the pixel luminance. However, going back and forth from the
RGB space to a perceptual color space has a non-negligible
cost and may generate non-integer perturbations. So, for a
practical implementation, we simply modify the three color
channels of a selected pixel by the same quantity. This also
causes some hue distortion, but negligible in practice.
V. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
In this Section, we analyze the performance of the proposed
black-box attack with reference to various classification tasks,
contexts, and datasets, that is:
A. general-purpose object recognition with CIFAR dataset;
B. biometric face recognition with MCS2018 dataset;
C. forensic source identification with SPCup2018 dataset.
Tasks and datasets will be described in detail in the following
dedicated subsections, A,B,C.
As performance metrics we will consider the success rate of
the attack, SR, the average distortion of successfully attacked
images, in terms of both PSNR (peak signal-to-noise ratio)
and SSIM, and the number of black-box queries necessary to
complete the attack, NQ. Note that, to ensure a meaningful
comparison, PSNR, SSIM, and NQ are all computed only on
successfully attacked images.
We will compare results with several baselines and state-
of-the-art references:
• IFD (iterative finite differences) [19] is the main baseline,
with pixel-wise perturbations, slow but characterized by
high success rate;
• IGE-QR-RG (iterative gradient estimation with query
reduction by random grouping) is a fast method proposed
in [19] based on group-wise perturbations;
• AutoZOOM-B is the version of AutoZOOM [20] which
uses bilinear interpolation to gain efficiency with no need
of prior information;
• NES-LQ is the limited-query method proposed in [21]
based on a natural evolution strategy.
In addition, we provide results also for the white-box I-FGSM
(iterative fast gradient sign method) attack [3], as a sort
of upper bound for the performance of black-box methods.
We use the code published by the authors online [31], [32],
[33], with the parameters suggested in the original paper, to
which the reader is referred for any further detail. For the
proposed method, based on preliminary experiments, we set
Q=66% N=20, δ=1, and kmax=20. Robustness with respect
to these parameters is analyzed in Tab.VIII with reference
to the challenging face recognition task. Our own code is
published online [34]. In all cases, unless otherwise specified,
we consider a 8-bit integer setting, hence images are rounded
if necessary after each iteration.
As reported in the literature, and confirmed by our experi-
ments, deep learning classifiers can be attacked with success
even in a black-box scenario. However, the defender can
enact a number of strategies to detect or avoid such attacks.
Therefore, together with the basic scenario of an unaware
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Fig. 5. The CIFAR10 attack scenario. The attacker injects some adversarial
noise to increase the confidence level of the target class.
defender, we will also consider a more realistic scenario in
which the defender adopts some simple defense strategies,
independent of the attack method.
JPEG defense. A first straightforward and effective defense
consists in including in the black-box model a suitable trans-
formation to wash out the adversarial noise possibly intro-
duced by the attacker. Indeed, under a signal processing point
of view, an adversarial perturbation can be seen as additive
high-frequency noise, effectively removed by a denoising filter
or even by simple JPEG compression [35], [36]. Because of the
non-differentiable nature of such transformations, the attacker
cannot circumvent them, even in a white-box scenario. On
the contrary, the defender can train the classifier directly on
transformed images, thereby maximizing the effectiveness of
the defense mechanism. We implement this defense strategy,
called in the following JPEG defense, by JPEG compressing
all images with quality factor 90, aligning the JPEG grid with
the original 8×8 grid to avoid double compression artifacts.
NN defense. For very small images, such as the CIFAR10
ones, JPEG compression does not make sense. Hence we
consider a second defense mechanism, at the architectural
level. We build on the empirical observation that sophisticated
classifiers are less robust to attacks than simpler ones. The
final fully connected layers of deep nets, trained with cross-
entropy loss, are rather complex classifiers, definitely prone
to attacks. Therefore, as a defensive strategy, in the following
NN defense, we replace this classifier with a simple nearest-
neighbor classifier. In this context, the network works as a
feature extractor, which is trained, by means of the triplet
loss [37], to map same/different-class images into close/far
features.
A. Object recognition with the CIFAR10 dataset
The popular CIFAR10 object recognition dataset comprises
60000 32×32-pixel RGB images, equally distributed among
10 classes. Due to the very low resolution, talking of percep-
tual quality does not make much sense, here. However, low
resolution implies lightweight images and fast processing. For
this reason, CIFAR10 is considered in most papers dealing
with black-box attacks, and represents a standard (this also
holds for the MNIST dataset on character recognition, we do
not include it for brevity). The CIFAR10 dataset is already
split in 50000 training and 10000 test samples, always equally
distributed among classes.
In the experiments, we attack all the images of the test
set, considering both an “easy” and a “hard” task. In the first
TABLE I
ATTACKING RESNET32 ON CIFAR10. EASY (TOP), HARD (BOTTOM).
Attack SR SSIM PSNR NQ
I-FGSM (white-box) 99.65 0.997 47.52 3
IFD 99.61 0.997 47.54 10446
IGE-QR-RG 99.57 0.994 45.44 2077
AutoZOOM-B 3.75 – – –
NES-LQ 28.39 – – –
PQP 99.99 0.996 44.85 531
I-FGSM (white-box) 98.69 0.991 42.65 9
IFD 99.01 0.991 42.67 26639
IGE-QR-RG 95.84 0.985 40.84 5467
AutoZOOM-B 0.00 – – –
NES-LQ 8.74 – – –
PQP 98.61 0.989 39.77 1593
TABLE II
ATTACKING RESNET56 ON CIFAR10. EASY (TOP), HARD (BOTTOM).
Attack SR SSIM PSNR NQ
I-FGSM (white-box) 99.16 0.997 47.09 4
IFD 99.63 0.997 47.10 10944
IGE-QR-RG 99.46 0.994 45.01 2219
PQP 99.98 0.996 44.34 579
I-FGSM (white-box) 98.71 0.991 42.41 9
IFD 99.05 0.991 42.42 26451
IGE-QR-RG 96.01 0.985 40.59 5518
PQP 98.66 0.989 39.51 1578
TABLE III
ATTACKING VGG16 ON CIFAR10. EASY (TOP), HARD (BOTTOM).
Attack SR SSIM PSNR NQ
I-FGSM (white-box) 92.41 0.992 44.23 9
IFD 92.20 0.991 41.88 29291
IGE-QR-RG 86.77 0.989 40.45 5018
PQP 94.28 0.990 41.40 1480
I-FGSM (white-box) 61.44 *0.980 *39.70 *36
IFD 57.14 *0.978 *35.66 *123534
IGE-QR-RG 42.70 *0.977 *35.26 *16450
PQP 73.93 *0.980 *37.45 *4207
Results marked with “*” may be overly optimistic.
case, we target the class with the highest confidence score,
except for the true class, while in the second case we target the
class with the lowest confidence score. The attack stops either
when the confidence of the selected target class exceeds 0.9, in
which case we label the attack as successful, or when the SSIM
goes below 0.95, a case of unsuccessful attack. Fig.5 depicts
the CIFAR10 attack scenario. Classification is performed by
four deep networks, ResNet32 and ResNet56 [38], VGG16
[39], and MobileNet [40], all trained on the CIFAR10 training
set. Note that all models misclassify a small fraction of the
test images. However, when this happens, the confidence is
always below 0.9, so we keep using these samples also for
the “easy” task.
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TABLE IV
ATTACKING MOBILENET ON CIFAR10. EASY (TOP), HARD (BOTTOM).
Attack SR SSIM PSNR NQ
I-FGSM (white-box) 96.50 0.994 44.88 8
IFD 96.07 0.993 43.21 25096
IGE-QR-RG 92.01 0.991 41.61 4421
PQP 94.06 0.992 42.26 1752
I-FGSM (white-box) 84.78 0.984 39.46 25
IFD 85.64 0.984 37.46 78549
IGE-QR-RG 69.85 *0.980 *36.22 *12718
PQP 79.62 0.983 37.57 4290
Results marked with “*” may be overly optimistic.
Tab.I shows results1 for both “easy” (top) and “hard”
(bottom) attacks to ResNet32. First of all, we observe a huge
gap between the success rates of IFD, IGE-QR-RG, and PQP,
all very close to 100%, and those of AutoZOOM-B and NES-
LQ, much lower. This is not surprising. While the former
are designed to work, or can be readily adapted to work
in our integer-valued setting, the latter are intrinsically real-
valued, with perturbations that are largely washed out by
rounding, leading to mostly ineffective attacks. With such
low SRs, of course, it makes no sense to compute the other
performance indicators. The very same behavior is observed
in all other experiments, and hence we will not consider these
methods anymore in our analysis. However, to establish a
meaningful comparison anyway, later on we will carry out
some experiments in a real-valued setting. Going back to the
successful methods, they all attack quite easily this classifier,
ensuring also a very low distortion. The worst PSNR, about
39.8 dB, is observed for PQP in the “hard” case, but even
in this case, the SSIM remains very high, almost 0.99, and
better than with IGE-QR-RG. With such high success rates and
good quality indicators, comparable to those of the white-box
attack, the truly discriminative metric is the number of queries.
Under this point of view, differences are more significant. In
particular, the proposed method is about 3 times faster than
IGE-QR-RG, and 15 times faster than the pixel-wise baseline
(a comparison with the white-box attack makes no sense). This
is very important in real-world scenarios, because the defender
may discourage attacks by blocking a client after a certain
number of queries. Therefore, reducing NQ may be the only
way to perform the attack. PQP ensures a sharp reduction in
the number of queries, with only a minor decrease in PSNR,
immaterial in practice, and no SSIM loss.
Tables II, III, and IV show results obtained attacking dif-
ferent models, that is, ResNet56, VGG16, and MobileNet. On
ResNet56, results are almost identical to those for ResNet32.
Instead, the performance impairs significantly on the other
nets, especially VGG16, and especially in the “hard” case.
Even in this challenging case, however, PQP keeps ensuring
a good performance, with a success rate of almost 74%, good
image quality, and much less queries than the other black-box
1Note for the reviewers: only for CIFAR10, PQP’s results are slightly better
than in the original submission, because we were inadvertently using an old
(and worse) set of parameters N = 40, Q = 33%.
Fig. 6. The CIFAR10 attack scenario with NN defense. The injected
adversarial noise brings the output feature vector close to the target class.
TABLE V
ATTACKING RESNET32 ON CIFAR10 (HARD) WITH NN DEFENSE.
γ Attack SR SSIM PSNR NQ
0.4
I-FGSM (white-box) 98.27 0.990 42.54 11
IFD 98.37 0.990 42.57 34110
IGE-QR-RG 93.92 0.986 41.06 6410
PQP 99.22 0.991 40.76 2181
0.3
I-FGSM (white-box) 96.95 0.988 39.66 14
IFD 96.95 0.988 39.68 44138
IGE-QR-RG 90.20 0.984 38.29 7971
PQP 98.08 0.989 37.96 2884
0.2
I-FGSM (white-box) 92.03 0.984 37.07 23
IFD 92.37 0.984 37.09 71420
IGE-QR-RG 81.37 0.980 36.04 11278
PQP 95.81 0.987 36.07 3991
methods. Note that when the success rate is too small, below
80%, performance indicators may be somewhat optimistic, as
they are computed only on the successful attacks, we mark
these situations with an asterisk. Instead, indicators are omitted
altogether, as totally unreliable, for success rates below 40%.
Tab.V shows results for attacks to ResNet32 in the presence
of NN defense, see also Fig.6. For each test image, x, the net
extracts a feature vector, called F here, computes its distance
from the centroid of all classes, F 1, . . . , F 10, computed on
the training set, and decides in favor of the closest one. In the
absence of attacks, this classifier is somewhat inferior to the
standard one, but it proves more robust to adversarial attacks.
In this experiment, we consider the worst-case attack, where
the target class is t = arg maxc ‖F − F c‖2. As before, the
attack stops in two cases i) the feature vector of the attacked
image, F a, becomes closer to F t than to all other centroids,
and the distance ‖F a − F t‖2 goes below a given threshold γ
(success) or ii) the SSIM of the attacked image goes below
SSIMmin=0.95 (failure). Three different values are considered
for γ, 0.4, 0.3 and 0.2, with lowest values corresponding
to more challenging tasks. In particular, 0.2 is the average
distance between the features of a class and the corresponding
centroid, while the average distance between the test images
and the centroid of their target-class (distance before attack)
is 0.81.
By comparing Tab.I and Tab.V, it is clear that the new
classifier is more robust to attacks. Success rates reduce
significantly, even for the white-box reference and for the IFD
method which emulates it at the cost of a very large number
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TABLE VI
REPLICATING THE EXPERIMENTS OF [20] ON CIFAR10.
Attack SR SSIM PSNR NQ
AutoZOOM-B 99.56 0.659 28.66 656
NES-LQ 100.00 0.898 28.63 1054
PQP 100.00 0.985 36.63 1754
PQP fast (N = 40, δ = 2) 100.00 0.968 33.52 616
TABLE VII
ATTACKING VARIOUS NETS ON CIFAR10 WITH NO ROUNDING.
Model Attack SR SSIM PSNR NQ
ResNet32
AutoZOOM-B 20.54 – – –
NES-LQ 100.00 0.880 27.56 1495
PQP 98.61 0.990 39.82 1585
VGG16
AutoZOOM-B 3.66 – – –
NES-LQ 99.50 0.901 28.70 9502
PQP 93.02 0.963 36.06 8088
MobileNet
AutoZOOM-B 9.54 – – –
NES-LQ 99.63 0.895 28.38 7969
PQP 92.27 0.970 36.60 13513
of queries. The impairment is more dramatic for the IGE-QR-
RG attack, with success rate going down to 81% for γ = 0.2,
notwithstanding a much larger number of queries. Despite
the increased robustness of the classifier, the proposed PQP
attack keeps ensuring a good success rate, now the best among
all methods, even in the most challenging case. Moreover,
it requires the smallest number of queries among black-
box methods, 3 times less than IGE-QR-RG and (obviously)
guarantees a good image quality, especially in terms of SSIM.
As said before, we now describe the results of some exper-
iments carried out in conditions such to allow a meaningful
comparison with the state-of-the-art methods AutoZOOM and
NES-LQ. In particular, we relax our requirement to work on
8-bit integer images, and use real-valued data.
In a first experiment, we use the very same setting consid-
ered in [20] where AutoZOOM is proposed, with the software
code and the black-box provided by the authors. We attack the
CIFAR10 test images, targeting any class except the true one,
and declare a success as soon as the confidence of the target
class exceeds all the others. Therefore, besides removing the
integer format constraint, we remove also all constraints on
SSIM and confidence level. Results are reported in Tab.VI.
As expected, AutoZOOM-B now obtains a very high success
rate, 99.56%, like in the original paper. Moreover, it requires a
rather small number of queries, on the average, 656 as opposed
to PQP’s 1754. However, the quality of the attacked images
is definitely poor and much worse than for PQP, with SSIM =
0.659 instead of 0.985 and PSNR = 28.7 dB instead of 36.6 dB.
To establish a clearer comparison between the two methods,
we changed slightly PQP’s parameters, doubling both N and δ.
With this modification, PQP and AutoZOOM-B have about the
same number of queries. However, the former keeps ensuring
a much better image quality. As for NES-LQ, it performs
uniformly worse than PQP fast.
Tab.VII regards a slightly more challenging setting. The
Fig. 7. The MCS2018 attack scenario (implicit NN defense). The injected
adversarial noise brings the output feature vector close to the feature vectors
associated with the sample images of the target subject.
constraints on data format and SSIM are removed, as before,
but a confidence level beyond 0.9 is now required to declare a
success and we target the worst class (“hard” task). Results are
for ResNet32, VGG16, and MobileNet. In these conditions,
AutoZOOM-B provides poor results, with a success rate of
20% or less. NES-LQ, instead, ensures an excellent success
rate. However, the image quality shows a serious impairment,
with a PSNR loss of about 10 dB, and a SSIM decrease of
about 0.1 with respect to PQP.
In summary, it seems safe to say that, at least for object
recognition on the CIFAR10 dataset, the proposed algorithm
works much better than reference methods not only in our
“real-world” scenario, but also in a more abstract scenario in
which all constraints on data format are removed.
B. Face recognition with the MCS2018 dataset
In the second set of experiments, we attack a face recog-
nition system. The problem was originally proposed in the
“Adversarial Attacks on Black Box Face Recognition” com-
petition, in the context of the MachinesCanSee conference
(MCS2018) held in Moscow in June 2018. The competition
was hosted on the Codalab platform [41].
The reference scenario is depicted in Fig.7. A black-box
face recognition system is provided, which extracts a 512-
component unit-norm feature vector from each submitted
112×112 RGB image. This vector is then fed to a database
to single out the best matching identity. In the competition,
the attacker was asked to imperceptibly modify an input
image associated with a given identity, with the aim of trick-
ing the system into recognizing a different specific identity.
1000 pairs of source-target identities (Si, Ti) were provided,
with 5 images for each identity: Si → {xsi1, . . . , xsi5}, and
Ti → {xti1, . . . , xti5}. The goal of the attacker was to move
the feature vector of the attacked image close to those of the
target identity. To make things precise, let Fij = BB(xsij) and
Gij = BB(x
t
ij) be the feature vectors generated by the black-
box system for source and target images, with F aij the feature
vector associated with the attacked image xs,aij . The goal is to
minimize
D =
1
1000
1000∑
i=1
1
25
5∑
j=1
5∑
k=1
‖F aij −Gik‖2 '
=
1
1000
1000∑
i=1
1
5
5∑
j=1
‖F aij −Gi‖2 (10)
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Fig. 8. Normalized histogram of the distance between each source image
and the corresponding target for full and reduced MCS2018 dataset.
TABLE VIII
CHOOSING PARAMETERS ON THE MCS2018 DATASET (γ = 1.0).
Q N δ SR SSIM PSNR NQ
66% 20 1 94.20 0.976 38.62 13265
33% – – 98.00 0.981 37.74 18348
100% – – 72.00 ∗0.968 ∗39.41 ∗10636
– 10 – 97.60 0.981 39.55 20093
– 40 – 85.00 0.972 37.69 8507
– – 2 63.20 ∗0.966 ∗36.91 ∗5163
– – 3 27.80 – – –
Results marked with “*” may be overly optimistic.
with Gi the centroid of the target identity features, subject
to SSIM(xsij , x
s,a
ij ) ≥ 0.95. Note that this systems includes
implicitly the NN defense. In the competition, we (the GRIP
team) obtained eventually the lowest distance [42], D=0.928,
using a preliminary version of the proposed algorithm.
Here, we modify slightly the attacker’s goal, in order to
define a success rate and allow for a meaningful comparison
with the other tasks. Not knowing the details of the classifier,
we declare a success for image xsij when ‖F aij − Gi‖ < γ,
with γ a suitably chosen threshold. Otherwise, if the attack
stops because the SSIM goes below 0.95, a failure is declared.
Since the feature vectors have unitary norm, unrelated vectors
are nearly orthogonal, with a distance close to
√
2 ' 1.414.
Features associated to the same identity are much closer,
with average intra-class distance 0.903. Therefore, we consider
three meaningful values for γ, 1.1, 1.0, and 0.9, the latter being
the most challenging.
Before proceeding to the comparative experiments, we car-
ried out some preliminary tests to select the best parameters
for the proposed method. To speed up this process, we used a
subset containing only 500 source images out of the original
5000, taking care to preserve the same distribution of source-
target distances, as shown in Fig.8. In the end, we chose
the parameters Q=66%, N=20 and δ=1. Describing in detail
all these tests would be tedious. Instead, in Tab.VIII we
show, for γ=1, the effect of perturbing parameters, one at
a time, with respect to their default value. Note that SSIM,
PSNR, and NQ are computed only on the successful attacks.
Therefore, they might be overly optimistic when SR  1,
in which case we mark results with an asterisk. These tests
TABLE IX
ATTACKING THE MCS2018 FACE RECOGNITION SYSTEM.
Attack SR SSIM PSNR NQ
γ=1.1
I-FGSM (white-box) 97.12 0.981 42.14 6
Pixel based 95.90 0.978 41.53 337965
IGE-QR-RG 41.80 ∗0.966 ∗39.14 ∗7035
PQP-α (grip) 90.22 0.970 35.60 8329
PQP 99.80 0.985 39.21 8335
γ=1.0
I-FGSM (white-box) 84.62 0.975 40.40 7
Pixel based 81.74 0.971 39.84 454743
IGE-QR-RG 16.44 – – –
PQP-α (grip) 66.68 ∗0.965 ∗34.46 ∗11883
PQP 95.80 0.978 37.13 13400
γ=0.9
I-FGSM (white-box) 62.76 ∗0.970 ∗39.25 ∗9
Pixel based 56.86 ∗0.967 ∗38.93 ∗536919
IGE-QR-RG 4.66 – – –
PQP-α (grip) 39.88 ∗0.962 ∗33.87 ∗14550
PQP 83.52 0.973 35.90 18244
Results marked with “*” may be overly optimistic.
show, for example, that increasing δ should be avoided, as it
causes a sharp decrease of the success rate. Also, attacking all
pixels irrespective of the SSIM increase (Q=100%) does not
seem advisable, as it lowers both success rate and quality. If
necessary, NQ can be more effectively reduced by increasing
N to 40.
Tab.IX shows results for attacks to the MCS2018 face
recognition system. To carry out experiments in a reasonable
time, we implemented a replica of the competition system
based on the organizer’s description and software, and testing
strict compliance of results. Given the stringent MCS2018
rules, attacks are much more difficult than in the CIFAR10
case. Even with a large distance threshold, γ=1.1, a level
which does not guarantee reliable face identification, the IGE-
QR-RG attack fails 60% of the times. At the same level,
the proposed PQP has a success rate close to 100%, even
better than I-FGSM and IFD. With lower values of γ, of
course, all performance metrics worsen, and at γ=0.9 only
PQP keeps ensuring a success rate over 80%. It is also worth
underlining the significant improvement with respect to PQP-
α, the preliminary version which ranked first in the MCS2018
competition, called “grip” in that context. Turning to the
number of queries, PQP is much faster than the IFD attack,
and somewhat slower than IGE-QR-RG. For this latter method,
however, the NQ data are not reliable, since they refer only
to the successful attacks, 40% of the total or less in all cases.
Image quality is guaranteed in all cases by the 0.95 constraint
on the SSIM. In any case, and with the warning on data
significance, PQP provides always the best SSIM and a pretty
good PSNR.
In order to gain a better insight into the performance of
all methods, we consider a “lighter” version of the MCS2018
system, where the constraint on the SSIM is replaced by a
much weaker constraint on PSNR, required only to exceed
30 dB. With these rules, success rates are always very high,
never less than 98%, allowing for the collection of significant
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TABLE X
ATTACKING A “LIGHTER” MCS2018 FACE RECOGNITION SYSTEM.
Attack SR SSIM PSNR NQ
γ=1.1
I-FGSM (white-box) 100.00 0.980 42.00 6
Pixel based 100.00 0.976 41.37 351987
IGE-QR-RG 100.00 0.939 37.05 11133
PQP-α (grip) 99.98 0.967 35.39 9377
PQP 100.00 0.985 39.20 8378
γ=1.0
I-FGSM (white-box) 100.00 0.968 39.71 9
Pixel based 100.00 0.964 39.18 544140
IGE-QR-RG 99.98 0.912 35.02 17498
PQP-α (grip) 99.86 0.954 33.90 21286
PQP 100.00 0.977 36.98 14620
γ=0.9
I-FGSM (white-box) 98.98 0.949 37.63 15
Pixel based 99.16 0.944 37.31 893743
IGE-QR-RG 98.36 0.878 33.56 27410
PQP-α (grip) 97.20 0.939 33.05 59440
PQP 99.60 0.965 35.39 30967
performance data. In these conditions, PQP is about as fast as
IGE-QR-RG, but ensures a much better quality, in terms of
both PSNR and SSIM. For the most interesting case of γ=0.9,
PQP keeps providing an average SSIM above 0.95, while for
IGE-QR-RG this drops well below 0.9, which entails very
likely visible distortions.
This is confirmed by Fig.9, showing visual results for the
various types of attacks on two MCS2018 images. Apparently,
the “bearded man” image is relatively simple to attack, and
all methods introduce only limited distortion. Nonetheless, for
γ=0.9, weird geometrical patterns and color distortions appear
in the flat areas of images attacked by all methods except
PQP. The “girl” image is obviously more difficult to attack,
and visible distortions arise even for γ=1. Also in this case,
however, the PQP images appear more natural than the others,
showing a lower quality than the original but without heavy
patterns and color distortions.
C. Results on the SPCup2018 dataset
Finally, we consider the source identification problem pro-
posed in the 2018 IEEE Signal Processing Cup. The goal was
to identify which one of a given set of cameras acquired the
image under test, without the help of any metadata, see Fig.10.
A dataset of 2250 images was provided, called SPCup2018
dataset from now on, with 2000 images for training and 250
for validation, evenly distributed among 10 different camera
models. The open phase of the competition was hosted on
Kaggle [43], followed by a restricted final phase held in the
context of IEEE ICASSP, in Calgary, march 2018.
For the competition we proposed a solution based on the
ensemble of several very deep CNNs, with a suitable fusion of
patch-level results [44]. Here, however, we consider a much
simpler classifier, with a single deep network, XceptionNet
[45], which proved very powerful for camera model identifica-
tion [46]. The net is trained on 96×96-pixel image patches. In
the absence of attacks, the classifier has an error rate of 8.4%,
but the wrong class has a relatively low confidence. Therefore,
TABLE XI
ATTACKING XCEPTIONNET ON SPCUP DATASET.
Attack SR SSIM PSNR NQ
original
I-FGSM (white-box) 87.20 0.987 47.71 4
Pixel based 89.20 0.986 47.67 103159
IGE-QR-RG 84.00 0.982 45.86 1662
PQP 100.00 0.994 50.22 1312
JPEG
I-FGSM (white-box) n/a n/a n/a n/a
Pixel based 99.58 0.992 49.70 221431
IGE-QR-RG 26.80 – – –
PQP 97.20 0.994 51.54 4718
we consider the “easy” attack, targeting the best wrong class.
Tab.XI shows results on the images of the validation set,
both in the absence of any defense and in the presence of
a defense based on JPEG compression with QF=90. In the
absence of defenses, the proposed method outperforms all
other techniques for all performance metrics. The success rate
is at least 10% higher than the references, including I-FGSM
and IFD, with a better image quality. Compared with PQP,
IGE-QR-RG requires also 20% more queries, while the IFD
approach is basically useless, calling for more than 100000
queries.
When the JPEG compression is performed, some interesting
results are obtained. First of all, NQ increases significantly
for all methods, testifying on the higher difficulty of the
problem. However, contrary to intuition, the IFD method
achieves a much better performance, with success rate close
to 100%. This happens because most small perturbations
occurring in homogeneous areas are simply canceled by the
JPEG compression. Therefore, actual perturbations take place
in the same areas selected by our approach, and similar results
are eventually obtained, at a much higher cost. The IGE-QR-
RG technique, instead, is strongly impaired by the defense
strategy, with a success rate dropping below 30%. As for the
proposed method, the defense has little or no effect, besides
the increased number of queries. Again, this is explained by
the fact that the attack concerns higher-activity regions which
are barely affected by JPEG compression.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have proposed a new black-box method for attacking
deep learning-based classifiers. The image under attack is iter-
atively modified until the desired classification and confidence
level are achieved. However, changes are constrained to the
low-SSIM gradient part of the image, where perturbations have
a limited impact on perceptual quality and, often, high impact
on classification. As a result, effective adversarial samples with
high perceptual quality are rapidly generated.
Experiments carried out in three quite different scenarios
testify on the potential of the proposed approach. Results are
always very good, both with 8-bit integer and real-valued
images, and do not impair much when some defense strategies
are enacted. Although attacked images exhibit a generally
good perceptual quality, visible distortions appear in some
challenging images. We believe this is due to the small size
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Original I-FGSM IFD IGE-QR-RG PQP I-FGSM IFD IGE-QR-RG PQP
Fig. 9. Example attacks on two MCS2018 images with γ = 1.0 (top) and γ = 0.9 (bottom). Originals are shown in the left column. For the “bearded man”,
a light adversarial noise is sufficient, and attacked images show little signs of distortion, more visible in the flat areas except for PQP. A heavier adversarial
noise is necessary to attack the “girl”, with visible distortions and many “weird” patters. PQP images are also distorted, but keep a natural appearance.
Fig. 10. The SPCup 2018 attack scenario with/without JPEG defense. The
injected adversarial noise increases the confidence level of the target class.
As a defensive means, images may be preliminarily JPEG compressed.
of images used to conduct our large scale validation, and
inconspicuous adversarial noise can be more easily introduced
on large images.
As next step of this research, we plan to extend our percep-
tual quality-preserving approach to the white-box context.
APPENDIX A
COMPUTING THE SSIM GRADIENT
Since the SSIM between two images is simply the average
of patch-level SSIM’s, we focus on the latter for the time
being. For notational compactness we will use the symbol S
for SSIM dropping dependence on the patches:
S = SSIM(p, q) =
(2µpµq + 1)(2σpq + 2)
(µ2p + µ
2
q + 1)(σ
2
p + σ
2
q + 2)
(11)
where p, q are the two homologous patches of the images
x0 and xa, and all moments are computed with a suitable
weighting window w as recommended in [22]
µq =
∑
s∈Ω
w(s)q(s)
σ2q =
∑
s∈Ω
w(s)(q(s)− µq)2
σpq =
∑
s∈Ω
w(s)(p(s)− µp)(q(s)− µq)
(12)
with s spanning the patch coordinates Ω. Similar formulas
hold for µp, σ2p. Now, following [30]
dS
dq(t)
=
∂S
∂µq
∂µq
∂q(t)
+
∂S
∂σpq
∂σpq
∂q(t)
+
∂S
∂σ2q
∂σ2q
∂q(t)
(13)
where all partial derivatives can be readily computed
∂S/∂µq = 2
µp(2σpq + 2)− µq(σ2p + σ2q + 2)S
(µ2p + µ
2
q + 1)(σ
2
p + σ
2
q + 2)
∂S/∂σpq = 2
1 + 2µpµq
(µ2p + µ
2
q + 1)(σ
2
p + σ
2
q + 2)
∂S∂σ2q =−
S
σ2p + σ
2
q + 2
(14)
and again
∂µq/∂q(t) = w(t)
∂σ2q/∂q(t) = w(t)× 2[q(t)− µq]
∂σpq/∂q(t) = w(t)× [p(t)− µp]
(15)
By substituting (14) and (15) in (13) we obtain the gradient
of the patch-level SSIM with respect to pixel q(t). Then, the
image-level SSIM is obtained by averaging over all patches.
It is worth pointing out that local weighted moments can
be obtained for the whole image through convolutions. This
suggested us to design the simple CNN shown in Fig.11,
comprising a single convolutional layer and some further
block for algebraic operations. The gradient of the SSIM with
respect to the whole image is then obtained by the usual back-
propagation of the loss.
𝑞
𝑝
SS
IM
(p
,q
)
𝜇𝑝
2
𝜇𝑝𝜇𝑞 Σ
𝑝2 𝜎𝑝
2
𝜎𝑞
2
𝜎𝑝𝑞
SSIM
𝜇𝑝2
𝜇𝑞2
𝜇𝑝
𝑞2
𝑝𝑞 𝜇𝑝𝑞
×
×
𝜇𝑞
+
𝜇𝑞
2
𝜇𝑝
𝜇𝑞
+
+
−
−
−
Fig. 11. Computing SSIM gradient by back-propagation on a ad hoc CNN.
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